Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark v. Phone Directories
Company, Inc., Marc Bingham : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John Preston Creer.
Edward D. Flint.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Clark v. Phone Directories Company, No. 930462 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5386

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

°mkk^

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 930462-CA

PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
MARC BINGHAM,

Classification 11

Defendants - Appellees
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC., and MARC BINGHAM
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District Court for Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge

Edward D. Flint (4573)
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 273-3333
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents, Phone Directories
Company, Inc. and Marc Bingham
John Preston Creer (0753)
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant, Cecil Clark

DEC 1 3 1993

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 930462-CA

PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation, and
MARC BINGHAM,

Classification 11

Defendants - Appellees
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC., and MARC BINGHAM
Appeal from Judgment of the Fourth Judicial
District Court for Utah County, State of Utah
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge

Edward D. Flint (4573)
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Telephone: (801) 273-3333
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents, Phone Directories
Company, Inc. and Marc Bingham
John Preston Creer (0753)
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300
Attorney for Plaintiff and
Appellant, Cecil Clark

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents

i

Table of Authorities

ii

•Jurisdictional statement

1

Statement of Issues Presented for Review

4

Statement of the Case

4

Summary of Arguments

6

Argument

7

Conclusion

23

Certificate of Service

25

Addendum: Statutes, court rulings, pleadings:
(A)

Notice of Appeal, June 4, 1993.

(B)

Certification of Judgment for Appeal, June 21, 1993.

(C)

Order, Court of Appeals, March 8, 1993.

(D)

Notice of Docket Number, Supreme Court, March 9, 1993.

(E)

Remittitur, Supreme Court, April 20, 1993.

(F)

Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court, April 20, 1993.

(G)

Notice from Clerk, Supreme Court, April 22, 1993.

(H)

Notice of Appeal, District Court, January 6, 1993.

(I)

Judgment, District Court, December 8, 1992.

(J)

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, District Court,
December 8, 1992.

(K)

Memorandum Decision, District Court, November 10, 1992.

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Cases:
Adele's Housekeeping, Inc. v. Dept. of Employment Security, 757
P.2d 480 (Ut. App. 1988). Cited at: 16.
Backstrom Family Ltd. Partnership v. Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App.
1988). Cited at: 3.
Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance and Furniture Co.,
770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988). Cited at: 7.
Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991). Cited at: 7.
General Ins. Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d
502 (Utah 1976). Cited at: 19.
Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142 (Ut. App.
1992) . Cited at: 22.
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991).
Cited at: 3.
Pate v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). Cited at: 3.
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 142 (Ut. App.
1989) . Cited at: 22.
Salt Lake City Corp. v. Lavton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979).
at: 3.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

Cited at:

Cited

7.

Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2 (Utah 1991). Cited
at: 4.
Statutes and Rules:
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cited at:

18, 19, 23.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cited at:

8.

Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cited at:

2, 3.

Utah Code Annotated, 35-4-22.3(3)(a - t), cited at:

9, 19.

(ii)

STATEMENT REGARDING JURISDICTION

Defendants deny jurisdiction in this Court in this case for
reason that this appeal is not from a final order or judgment of
the District Court.

Because this is a jurisdictional issue,

appellants address this issue at this juncture.
Plaintiff Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark (hereinafter referred to
as, "Clark") previously appealed the judgment entered against him
by the trial Court, filing his Notice of Appeal with the Fourth
District Court on January 6, 1993. Defendants then filed a Motion
for Summary Disposition arguing that Clark's appeal was not from
a final judgment of the trial court and was not ripe for appeal.
Defendants argued that the judgment below did not resolve all
of the claims of all of the parties, since a Counterclaim remains
pending in the District Court against Clark.

The order that

disposed of Clark's Complaint against Phone Directories Company,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "PDC") and Marc Bingham did not
dispose of Clark as a party to the lawsuit, nor did it dispose of
PDC's claims against Clark.
Plaintiff then moved to have this case placed back before the
Supreme Court for reason that he had erroneously filed the appeal
with the Court of Appeals, which motion was granted and the case
transferred to the Supreme Court, which then addressed the Motion
for Summary Disposition.

On April 20, 1993, the Supreme Court, in

a memorandum decision, granted the Motion and dismissed Clark's
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appeal "on the ground that the appeal is from a judgment which is
not final, and this court has no jurisdiction" citing to Rule
54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant Clark presents now the same issues, statements and
the same circumstances except for one thing:

after the Supreme

Court remanded this case back to the District Courtf Clark moved
for and was granted a new Order from the trial court, certifying
that the Judgment dismissing Clark's case "is a final judgment,
pursuant to Rule 54B (sic) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
can be appealed."
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states:
Rule 54. Judgments: costs.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving
multiple parties. When more than one claim for
relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved,
the court may direct the entry of a final judgment
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims
or parties only upon an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
In the absence of such determination and direction,
any order or other form of decision, however
designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of
the claims or parties, and the order or other form
of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
The "certification" drafted by Appellant Clark and signed by
the trial court does not make "an express determination by the
court that there is no just reason for delay," but merely states
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that the Order is made "pursuant to Rule 54B (sic) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure and [the judgment] can be appealed."

No

amendments were made to the judgment entered by the trial court.
This self-serving statement in the pleading drafted by Appellant
does not create jurisdiction for appellate review so long as fewer
than all the parties' claims are adjudicated.
Clark admits

in his Appellant's

Brief, p. 3, under the

heading, "Disposition in the Lower Court," that the "remaining
issues

of

wrongful

termination,

damages

and

defendants'

Counterclaim were not litigated or otherwise resolved."
A judgment is final when it ends the controversy between all
of the litigant parties. Salt Lake City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d
538 (Utah 1979).

Half the controversy herein remains pending in

the lower court.

Phone Directories Company has a counterclaim

against Sonny Clark that has not been resolved.
Clark remains a party to the suit; he is not disposed of as
a party to the lawsuit when he loses his case in chief because the
pending counterclaim keeps him a party.

The lower court's order

cannot be a final order because of the pending counterclaim.
v. Marathon Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984);
Ltd. Partnership

v.

Pate

Backstrom Family

Hall, 751 P.2d 1157 (Ut. App. 1988).

Whether the lower court's ruling is final for appellate
purposes is a question of law for this Court.

Kennecott Corp. v.

State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991).

Where a factual

overlap exists, between the complaint and the counterclaim, the
entire matter must be resolved before any ruling is "final" and can
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be appealed.

Town of Manila v. Broadbent Land Co., 818 P.2d 2

(Utah 1991).
Jurisdiction is not properly laid herein and Clark's appeal
should be dismissed.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

A.

Were the Conclusions of Law by the District Court correct

and whether the Court of Appeals should vacate them.
B.

Was Clark an employee or an independent contractor?

C.

Must the trial court accept admissions made in the Answer

to the Complaint, or may testimony be introduced in contradiction
to an admission and may the court's findings be based, in part, on
such testimony adduced at trial?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Defendants concur with part of the "Statement of the Case"
section of Appellant's Brief at p. 3, but deny the Appellant's
allegations as contained in the section subtitled "Relevant Facts"
as it appears in Appellant's Brief at p. 4.
Defendants agree with Appellant's "Relevant Facts" numbered
one through three, but dispute those numbered four and five. PDC
and Bingham deny that Clark was terminated for responding to a
4

subpoena and testifying, but conversely state that PDC did not seek
to contract further with Clark because of his failure to complete
the

terms

of

prior

agreements,

and

because

he

had

become

undesireable to work with, and for other legitimate business
reasons.

Further, appellees deny that Clark was ever an employee

of Phone Directories or was improperly terminated or that any state
or federal taxes were due or payable by PDC or Bingham.
These "Relevant Facts" listed by Appellant are argumentative
and conclusory.
Course of Proceedings, Disposition of Case Below.
The course of proceedings and the disposition at and after
trial differ from that described by the Appellant.
filed

an appeal

from the District

Court

Clark first

judgment

which was

dismissed upon the Supreme Court's entry dated April 20, 1993, "on
the ground that the appeal is from a judgment which is not final,
and this court has no jurisdiction."
This case was remitted to the District Court on April 22,
1993.

The only difference between this appeal the one previously

dismissed

by

the

Supreme

Court

is

that

Clark

obtained

"Certification of Judgment for Appeal" from the trial court.
judgment,

findings

undisturbed.

of

fact

and conclusions

a
The

of

law were all

The issues on appeal were the same.

The defendants

counterclaim remains unresolved and is pending in the District
Court.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Based upon the evidence and testimony at trial, the District
Court made findings of fact which either supported the contention
that

Clark

was

an

independent

contractor

or

supported

the

contention that he was an employee of defendants. When all of the
evidence was weighed and considered, the trial court's conclusion
was that Clark was an independent contractor.

This ruling was

correct and should not be altered.
The lower court, in finding that Clark was an independent
contractor and not an employee, permitted certain testimony at
trial which directly contradicted the defendants' Answer to the
Complaint.

Defendants had made admissions in the Answer that were

incorrect, and witnesses testified to facts tending to prove the
opposite of what was admitted in the Answer.

These facts were

allowed into evidence, and were sufficient to convince the lower
court at bench trial that Clark could hire subcontractors and could
not be terminated at will,

which are facts supporting a finding

that Clark was a contractor and not an employee.
The trial court did not err in admitting such evidence and
testimony over the objection of Appellant, where the defendants had
previously admitted the same allegations in their Answer.

If this

is an error, it is a harmless error.
The appeal of Clark is without merit.
findings

of

fact

were

more

than

conclusions of law.
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The lower court's

sufficient

to

support

its

ARGUMENT
POINT I,

THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT

WERE CORRECT AND SHOULD BE UPHELD

Appellant asks that the lower court's conclusions should be
reviewed on appeal to determine their correctness and consistency
with the findings of fact.
Appellant

describes testimony

favorable to his position,

recites portions of the lower court's findings and conclusions on
that particular issue, and argues that the trial court made the
wrong decision.

Omitted

is the overwhelming evidence that

supports the conclusion that Clark was an independent contractor.
The District Court acted as fact finder in this bench trial,
and its well-reasoned findings of fact should not be overruled
absent a clear showing that the great weight of the evidence does
not support the findings.
1987).

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah

In reviewing a judgment after a bench trial, the appellate

court will defer to the trial court's factual assessment unless
there is a clear error.

Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker

Appliance and Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988);

Eskelsen v.

Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991).
Appellant makes no attempt to show that the lower court's
findings were erroneous or lacked support.

He fails to note that

the trial court depended upon the testimony of at least five
witnesses, three

of which were
7

called

by Clark

as

his own

witnesses. (Finding of Fact No. 5).
Clark also omits in reference to his own testimony, the
impeachment of his character and his own tax records and accounting
of his business affairs, which were weighed by the trial court in
determining his believability and in resolving inconsistencies in
testimony.

Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states in

part:
Rule 52. Findings by the Court.
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court
shall find the facts specially and state separately
the conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall
be entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or
refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall
similarly set forth the findings of fact and
conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of
its action. Requests for findings are not necessary
for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of witnesses. . . .
[remainder of Rule 52(a) is omitted]
There

is

nothing

in

Appellant's

brief

to

justify

any

alteration of the lower court's findings and conclusions.

POINT II.
CLARK WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR

The dispute below is whether PDC controlled Clark to the
extent that he was an employee, or did not have that degree of
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control thereby making Clark was an independent contractor.
Both Clark and defendants PDC and Bingham agreed at the time
of trial to utilize Utah Code Ann. 35-4-22.3(3) (a through t) to
establish the criteria to be considered that distinguish between
employee status and independent contractor status.

This section

is part of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act and is, in fact,
the criteria used

in determining

administratively

individual applying for benefits is eligible.

whether an

The District Court

considered the facts of this case in light of the potential
application of each of the subsections (a) through (t) of the Act.
The trial court found that some of the evidence did support
Clark's position, and found in his favor on those points. As found
in the Conclusions of Law, these include the following (portions
potentially favorable to Clark are underlined):

Subsection (b): Though plaintiff was
attend an annual meeting. PDC imposed
any, formal training requirements. PDC
allowed Mr. Clark to use his own sales

required to
minimal, if
essentially
methods.

Subsection (f)s
Plaintiff had a continuing
relationship with PDC,
but did so only by
continuing to accept new "books" as PDC offered them
to him. Plaintiff essentially worked on a book-bybook basis.
Subsection (k): Plaintiff was required to submit
regular reports to enable PDC to determine what
money was owed him.
Subsection (n): Defendants supplied some forms for
plaintiff's use in his sales. However, plaintiff
was responsible for any other materials to the
extent that they were necessary.
Subsection (q): Although plaintiff devoted some
time to his heating and air conditioning business,
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plaintiff spent the majority of his time fulfilling
contracts for PDC.
Subsection (r) : Plaintiff did not have his own
office, hold a business license, maintain a business
telephone, or advertise.

In

some

instances, the

testimony

revealed

that

certain

elements of "control" were necessary and innocuous, such as the
fact that PDC supplies customer contracts to the sales persons in
order to maintain uniformity and ensure delivery of the service to
the customer.
Clark was also required to submit regular reports, but that
only makes sense if he wants to receive his commission for his
sales.

Clark admitted at trial that a company cannot pay a sales

commission until the sales person properly accounts for it by
turning in contracts and sales reports. (Tr. 77 1. 7-12).
PDC did schedule a sales meeting and did call it "mandatory"
in its announcement, and Clark did attend.
presented

that

any

sales

No

representatives

evidence
were

"fired"

was
or

disciplined in any manner for not attending the sales meeting.
Clark testified that he did not know of a single individual fired
for failure to attend any sales meeting. (Tr. 68, 1. 23-25).
Despite the trial court's finding that Clark did not have his
own office, telephone or business license, Clark's tax records for
1980-1990 (Defendants' Exhibits 9-19), indicate that he deducted
thousands of dollars for a home office, utilities, telephone, home
mortgage interest, business licenses, legal expenses, travel and
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entertainmentf and automobile milage.

Clark held himself out to

be self-employed in all of his business dealings.
Clark complains that PDC places deadlines on him to complete
and turn in sales work. However, Clark himself testified that the
reason PDC closes sales on a particular directory is "so they can
have time to do production and printing and all of that before the
book should be issued." (Tr. 72 1.22-25; p. 74 1. 13 through p. 75
1. 25).
Clark

alleges

that

he

could

not

hire

and

supervise

subcontractors to help in his sales work and that he could not
assign his duties or income to another person.

However, Clark

admits that he asked PDC to assign all of his 1989 commissions to
his ex-wife, Linda Clark, totaling $34,132.15. (Tr. 185 1. 19
through p. 188 1. 2).

Clark also paid Linda Clark $1,780.00 in

1985 to be his "secretary/" and the deduction was taken on Clark's
Schedule C tax form for his sole proprietorship business of
directory advertising sales. (Tr. 132 1. 22 through p. 133 1. 7;
Defendants' Exhibit 14).
Clark's association with PDC is typical of the relationship
between PDC and its [other] salespeople.

(Findings of Fact No. 5).

Despite Clark's contentions, other sales representatives testified
that the normal way sales people operated was consistent with the
way independent contractors operate.
Cindy Sortor testified that her first experience with PDC came
after meeting Sonny Clark in 1983 while both she and Clark were
selling ads for a publications called, "TV Fanfare" in Great Falls,
11

Montana.

She testified that Clark told her about his concurrent

sales work for PDC and asked her to join him selling yellow page
advertising.

When Sortor and Clark went on her first PDC sales

canvass to Reno, Nevada, she and Clark split their commissions with
each other. (Tr. 238, 1. 22 to p. 239, 1. 1; and, p. 240 1. 20
through p. 241 1. 3).
Other persons have worked for Sortor, from time to time,
helping her perform her sales duties. She hired her sister to close
sales in one part of one market, paying her $300.00 per week. (Tr.
241 1. 7-23). She also hired another sister, and split commissions
with her mother-in-law and with other PDC sales representatives.
She hired a non-relative once to work in her home office and make
telephone contacts with customers she may have missed while in that
area, mail out contracts to customers, help her with filing and
paperwork, and paid that person an hourly wage. (Tr. 276 1. 9
through p. 277 1. 6).
As for Clark, Sortor testified that she knew of a time when
Clark hired subcontractors (Tr. 252 1. 15-20) and that Clark has
also sold ads for other yellow pages publishers. (Tr. 253 1. 1520) .
Sortor also testified that she has a Mary Kay Cosmetics
proprietorship

which

she

operates

in

addition

to

employment as a yellow pages ad sales representative.

her

self

She has a

separate office at home, and she does Mary Kay work in other towns
while she is there selling ads for PDC. (Tr. 230 1. 18-23; 231 1.
21 through 232 1. 8).

She even gave facials, sold products and
12

recruited new sales reps to work for her at the motel room she was
using as her directory sales headquarters. (Tr. 299 1. 2-12).
She states that PDC does not pay for or reimburse for items
like glue stick or scissors, even though these are necessary tools
of the business of ad sales, and that she is free to work her own
schedule. (Tr. 245

1. 3-24).

She directly contradicted Clark's testimony on nearly every
point , and for each subsection of the code that describes the
differences between contractor and employee, Sortor testified that
there was little or no control by the company over the sales
contractors.
No requirement existed requiring sales representatives work
a set schedule or number of hours. (Tr. 246 1. 7-15). She has
complete freedom to come and go as she wishes. (Tr. 284 1. 1-19).
She is free to make a sale by telephone and mail the contract to
the customer. (Tr. 248 1. 11-24).

There is no requirement to call

in daily or weekly, but PDC does request that information be called
in to aid their record keeping; she has never been sanctioned for
her own failures to call in. (Tr. 250 1.5-12).
specific

training

contractors

were

requirement.
rewarded

with

(Tr. 251
cash

1.

3-

bonuses

There is no
10).
for

Sales

attending

"mandatory" sales meetings, but were never sanctioned for not
attending, and Sortor admits she showed up for one such meeting,
collected her bonus and left before the meeting ended. (Tr.
1. 11-22; p. 252 1. 1-10).

251

She can set her own time schedule and

the company has never set a time schedule for her. (Tr. 254 1. 1513

19) . Never has she been required to have full-time devotion to this
work, and is not restricted from doing other work and is allowed
to work at her own pace. (Tr. 254 1. 24 through 255 1. 7). She was
never told how to dress by anyone at PDC, despite the "dress code"
published in the manual, and wears clothing she thinks appropriate
for the community and the clientele. (Tr. 259 1. 1-24). Never has
she been sanctioned for declining PDC's offer to work a market she
did not like. (Tr. 278 1. 2-6).
Clark was found to have a continuing relationship with PDC,
but this relationship was on a "book by book" basis, and PDC would
extend him invitations to work in certain markets (Findings of Fact
No. 11).

Sortor testified that she requests certain markets be

assigned to her each year, and PDC has always renewed their working
relationship in two, specific markets because of Sortor's success;
however, PDC has declined to offer some markets to her, including
some that she had previously worked in, and had requested to have
again. (Tr. 290 1. 2-20).
Vickie lechelbeger testified that she makes separate, verbal
agreements with PDC to sell in a particular market, based on her
requests for areas and time periods of her own liking, and, how
confident PDC's sales director is that she will make the kind of
sales that the company projects and expects. (Tr. 305 1. 13-24).
The only work a sales representative is prohibited from is
direct competition with PDC. lechelbeger currently operates a dump
truck service with her brother while contracting to sell ads for
PDC in several markets. (Tr. 306 1. 11 through 307 1. 2). She,
14

too, hired another person (her brother) to assist her in her
advertising sales, paying him from her own account. (Tr. 312 1. 15
through 313 1. 14).
Iechelbeger also confirmed much of Sortor's testimony: that
she could set her own schedule; she is free to use her own methods
and techniques; training tapes and videos were made available by
PDC but she was never required to use them; that she could hire
others to help her; that no guarantees existed for contractors to
return to a specific market; she is not required to work full time
in ad sales; she is not required to call in daily; and, that her
"required"

weekly

commissions earned.

sales

report

is

really

just

a

bill

for

You can't get paid unless you send a bill.

Clark chose to work or refrain from working other jobs or in
other independent businesses. This was his choice to make and PDC
did not force him to give up his other business ventures, nor was
he prohibited from new business involvements.
If the sales person doesn't complete the contract and leaves
before the market has been fully canvassed, then PDC has no
incentive to contract with that person for any future sales
campaigns because her or she is not dependable or reliable, and PDC
sometimes is forced to send others to complete the job, according
to Cindy Sortor. (Tr. 263 1. 2-24).
According to Paul Starkey, who was PDC's national sales
manager

in

1991

prior

to

when

Clark

alleges

the

wrongful

termination, Clark had not finished two contracted areas and
therefore, Starkey opted to not allow Clark to contract with PDC
15

for another directory, but that no sales representative would have
their contract terminated unless they failed to complete that
directory by the closing date. (Tr. 386 1. 11 through 387 1. 14).
Despite Starkey's objections, PDC did agree to let Clark sell
in Alaska in 1991, and again, Clark left early, before the job was
done. (Tr. 388 1. 23 through 389 1. 16).
Overall, the lower court found that a large preponderance of
the evidence supported the defendants' contention that Clark was
an independent contractor. Appellant Clark relies on a 1987 sales
manual that, according to PDC secretary lone Chilton, was actually
compiled from another publisher's manual, and much of which did not
apply to the way PDC did business with its contractors, and the socalled "requirements" of this manual (dress code, calling in to
office, etc.) were never enforced. (Tr. 349 1. 6 through 351 1.
23). Several witnesses contradicted the allegations of Clark, and
the trial court weighed all of this testimony in making its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The necessary indices of
control by an employer over an individual simply are not present
in the instant case to find Clark to be an employee.
This case compares factually to Adele's Housekeeping, Inc. v.
Deot. of Employment Security, 757 P.2d 480 (Ut. App. 1988).

The

housekeeping service was held not to be an employer, and the
individual housekeepers were contractors and not employees where
the service provided

job assignments, advertised

and took a

referral fee from each customer account, and the housekeepers had
their

own

equipment

and

supplies,
16

provided

their

own

transportation, were paid by the job but were not told how or when
to do their job, and paid their own taxes.

POINT III, THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
BY ALLOWING ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE CONTRARY TO DEFENDANTS'
ADMISSIONS IN THEIR ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT.

The
Complaint,

original
and

counsel

again,

in

for

defendants,

submitting

an

in

answering

Amended

Answer

the
and

Counterclaim, failed to correctly respond to several allegations
in the Complaint.

Specifically, paragraph 8(f) of the Amended

Answer states:
Defendants admit that during his employment with
PDC, plaintiff could not hire subcontractors to
solicit yellow page advertising for him or with him.
(Amended Answer, p. 4, paragraph 8f.)
Testimony from several witnesses was allowed by the trial
court, which established that many sales representatives of PDC do
hire

subcontractors

to

help

them

perform

sales,

appointment

setting, message taking, delivery of ad proofs and so forth. Clark
denied that he ever subcontracted out sales work and denied that
PDC would permit such conduct, but other witnesses testified
differently.

The District

Court, weighing

the evidence and

examining the candor and believability of the witnesses, agreed
that sales representatives may employ subcontractors.
Defendants also erroneously admitted in paragraph 8k. of the
Answer:
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Defendants admit that during his employment with
PDC, plaintiff could have been terminated as an
independent contractor at any time.
(Amended Answer p. 5, paragraph 8k.)
These allegations correspond to subsections (s) and (t) of the
Unemployment Act, and the trial court held in its Conclusions of
Law:
Subsection (s): PDC could not have terminated
plaintiff during the performance of any given
contract, unless plaintiff breached the contract.
Subsection (t):
Plaintiff probably could have
terminated his relationship with PDC at any time.
The admission of paragraph 8k. of the Amended Answer was found
to be incorrect based upon the evidence and testimony at trial,
and the findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered
consistent with the trial testimony and evidence.

The Court was

not bound by the admission contained in the Amended Answer.
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in part states:
RULE 15. AMENDED AND SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence.
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendments of the
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issues.
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting
party fails to satisfy the court that the admission
of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court
18

shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable
the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(emphas is added).
(c) Relation back of amendments . Whenever the
claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading
arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the
date of the original pleading.
[Rule 15 (b) and (c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]

The foregoing rule permits liberal amending of any pleading
to conform to the evidence, and should apply to Answers as well as
Complaints.

Failure to amend does not change the result

of a

trial on the merits of these issues.
Whether

a

defense

was

pleaded

in

the

Answer,

even

an

Affirmative defense, is not conclusive if the issue is ultimately
tried by express or implied consent.

General Ins. Co. of America

v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp. , 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 1976).

At the time

of trial, Clark had sought, and the parties stipulated to, a
bifurcation of trial of the issues, and agreed that he would
dismiss his claim for wrongful termination if the court found that
he was an independent contractor and not an employee.
Clark consented to the trial of these issues, which turned out
adverse to his expectations.

Both parties consented to the

splitting of issues for trial on the merits, and both parties
impliedly consented to use of Utah Code Ann. 35-4-22.3(3) as a
measuring stick by which Clark's employment

status was to be

judged, since both parties relied upon this statute in their trial
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briefs.

Clark consented to introduction of any relevant evidence

regarding his status as a contractor or employee since these were
his chosen issues for which he had sought relief in his lawsuit,
and he had the burden of proof on each of these issues.
The language of Rule 15 states that any "failure so to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues."

Clark

lost on these issues at a trial on the merits. The results should
stand because the evidence supports the trial court's conclusions,
regardless of what is denied or admitted in the Answer.
These two items were defective in defendants' Answer and
Amended

Answer.

Witnesses

at

trial

established

that

sales

representatives in fact contracted with PDC for each publication,
each year, and as a matter of practice and policy, their contracts
were terminated only in rare instances, such as where the sales
representative left before finishing, or some improper conduct by
the contractor would amount to a breach of their contract with PDC.
If a sales representative does poorly, he or she may not
receive future invitations from PDC to sell ads for other or
subsequent
certainly

directories,
must

be

or

in

another market.

allowed

to

protect

its

own

The

company

interests

by

contracting with only those sales persons that are capable and
effective.
The Amended Answer clearly was incorrect in admitting that
employment

could be terminated at will, and the trial court

permitted the contradictory evidence to be admitted. As a result,
the court found that Clark could both hire subcontractors, and,
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that he could not be terminated at will.
Plaintiff-Appellant Clark is not relieved of his burden of
proof.

If Clark could not affirmatively prove that subcontracting

was prohibited and that he could have been terminated at will, then
he fails in his burden of proof on these two points. The evidence
at trial clearly supported the findings and conclusions on these
issues.
Appellant Clark did not seek specific exclusion of evidence
by means of a Motion in Limine prior to, or at the time of trial.
Clark has never asserted

how he would be prejudiced

by the

admission of this particular testimony at trial. The testimony was
useful to the trier of fact in making his findings.
Clark's

only

objection

to

this

testimony

is

that

it

contradicts two of defendants' admissions in the Amended Answer.
The testimony that Clark objects to establishes that PDC sales
representatives can subcontract and cannot be terminated at will.
Clark was permitted to, and did, present testimony and other
evidence to the trial court that purported to prove that Clark and
other sales representatives were prohibited from subcontracting and
could be terminated at will.

These conflicting testimonies were

examined and weighed by the trial court, which found the weight of
the evidence supported finding Clark an independent contractor and
not an employee.
The evidence supporting the defendants' contention that Clark
could

and

did

hire

subcontractors

and

that

his

contractual

relationship with PDC could only be terminated if he breached the
21

contract, was probative and valuable to the lower court.
Many different facts were considered by the lower court in
arriving at its decision, and the outcome of the ruling would have
been the same, even if this evidence had been excluded.

Defendant

prevailed on nearly every criteria listed in each subsection of the
law as addressed by the lower court and a different finding on
these two issues alone would not be enough to change the result.
Clark was proven to be a contractor and not an employee because the
weight of the evidence supported such a conclusion.
Appellant Clark misstates the findings of Hill v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. , 829 P.2d 142 (Ut. App. 1992). In that case,
the trial court correctly denied plaintiff leave to amend his
complaint after seven years of litigation, to include allegations
of tortious conduct that would support their prayer for punitive
damages.

The trial court found that this proposed amendment was

so late in the course of the litigation that it was not timely, not
justified and would result in prejudice to the responding party,
and because the movant was clearly aware of the facts underlying
the proposed amendment long before its filing.
The test in allowing or disallowing an amended pleading is
based on three factors:

"the timeliness of the motion; the

justification given by the movant for the delay; and the resulting
prejudice to the responding party." Ibid, at 149, citing Regional
Sales Agency, Inc., v. Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Ut. App.
1989).

Neither these cases nor any cited by Appellant deal with

the issue of amendments to an answer.
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The Appellant has failed to show that he was or could be
prejudiced

in

any

way

by

admitting

evidence

contradicted admissions made in the Answer.

at

trial

that

Appellant Clark was

the party that suggested trying this issue separately, and he
cannot possibly claim surprise or prejudice if the defendants
merely present evidence to support their defense.

Rule 15, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, permits the findings and conclusions,
after a trial on the merits, to stand, even if they are partly
based on this evidence which contradicts the pleadings.
Whether defendants are allowed to actually amend their earlier
Answer is not important.

Evidence properly came before the court

at trial which supported or refuted claims of the respective
parties, and this evidence resulted in the lower court findings
against Clark, which findings should not be disturbed.

CONCLUSION

Defendants and Appellees Phone Directories Co., Inc., and Marc
Bingham, pray the Court of Appeals to Dismiss the Appeal of
Plaintiff and Appellant, Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark and deny him
any relief sought herein.

This Court lacks proper jurisdiction

over this matter for reason that Clark's appeal is from an order
of the District

Court which

is not

final so long as PDC's

counterclaim against Clark remains pending in the District Court.
This Court should dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Should the other issues be considered by the Court, Defendants
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argue that Clark was found to be an independent contractor and
specifically not an employee, after the District Court properly
weighed and reviewed the evidence and the testimony of witnesses
at a trial on the merits.

The evidence from trial supports the

findings.
There

is no reason

to reverse

conclusions of the lower court.
including

the admission

any of

the

findings or

Evidence was properly admitted,

of evidence

in contradiction

to the

defendants' Answer, and findings based upon this evidence were
properly entered.

The legal characterization of Clark as an

independent contractor resulted in the dismissal of his suit
against PDC and Bingham, and was arrived at based on the weight of
the evidence supporting this conclusion.
error.

There is no reversible

Clark's appeal lacks merit.

WHEREFORE, Defendants and Appellees submit that the Appeal of
Clark should be dismissed, or in the alternative, that the judgment
of the District Court be affirmed.
DATED

this

jI

day of December, 1993.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that service of the foregoing Brief of the
Defendants/Appellees

Phone Directories Company,

Inc. and Marc

Bingham, was made by mailing/hand dyllvorlftg at least two copies
of

the

foregoing

brief

to

John

Preston

Creer,

counsel

for

Plaintiff/Appellant, 1200 Beneficial Life Tower, 36 South State
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111,
December, 1993.
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JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK,
Plaintiff,

7

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, and
MARC BINGHAM,

CIVIL NUMBER 910400806
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING

Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark, plaintiff above
named, hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court on Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order signed by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, on
December 8, 1992, and entered on December 9, 1992, and an Order entered on

May 18, 1993, that the Final Judgment heretofore referred to was certified for
appeal.
Dated this

7

day of June, 1993.

Jomy£reston Creer
/Attorney for the Plaintiff

i/

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, on the #

day of June, 1993 to the

following:
Edward D. Flint
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATION OF
JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL

vs.

PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC.
a Utah Corporation, and
MARC BINGHAM,
Defendants.

CIVIL NUMBER 910400806
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING

On the 8th day of December, 1992, Judgment was entered after a bench
trial, held on August 27, 28 and September 22,1992. A copy of the Judgment is
attached hereto.

It is hereby certified that this Judgment is a final judgment, pursuant to
Rule 54B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and can be appealed.
DATED this ZLI

^

day of June, 1993.

—

R5yM. Harding
met Court Judge

Approved as to Form:

Edward D. Flint
Attorney for the Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
CERTIFICATION OF JUDGMENT FOR APPEAL was mailed, postage
prepaid, on the /x day of May, 1993 to the following:
Edward D. Flint
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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EXIBIT C

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

*»r

Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark
Plaintiff and Appellant,

ORDER
Case No. 930016-CA

v.
Phone Directories Company,
Inc., a Utah corporation;
and Marc Bingham,
Defendants and Appellees.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion
to transfer this appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, filed
February 26, 1993.
Now therefore IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above appeal
is transferred to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 44,
Utah R. App. P.
Dated this

r/

day of March, 1993.

FOR THE COURT:

A

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the f)(A day of March, 1993, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the
following:
John Preston Creer
Attorney at Law
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
Edward D. Flint
Flint & Christensen
Attorneys at Law
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Fourth District
Utah County
125 North 100 West
Provo, UT
84601
Trial Court No. #901400806

fauJLt/.v/<? Ls
/

Caroline Workman
J u d i c i a l Secretary

930016-CA
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EXIBIT D

IN THJi bUFKtriL uuuivj.

STATE OF UTAH
3 32 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
March 9, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
4 t h D i s t . C o u r t Utah C o u n t y
Appeals Clerk
125 N o r t h 100 West

Provo, UT

oil

%-\^AX

CAHil.
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. dryty

84601

Cecil Eugene "Sonny11 Clark,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Phone Directories Company,
Inc., a Utah Corproation,
and Marc Bingham,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 930116
930016-CA
910400806

The above referenced case has been transferred from the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. All further documents
should be filed with the Supreme Court. Please take note of the
above-referenced Supreme Court docket number.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk
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Regular February Term, 19936

April 20, 1993

Cecil Eugene "Sonny11 Clark,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

REMITTITUR
No. 930116
District No. 910400806

v.
Phone Directories Company,
Inc., a Utah Corporation,
and Marc Bingham,
Defendants and Appellees.

Appellee's motion to dismiss this matter is hereby
granted on the ground that the appeal is from a judgment which
is not final, and this court has no jurisdiction.

Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure 54(b).

Issued:

April 22, 1993

Record:

None

At

EXIBIT F

STATE OF UTAH
3 32 STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114
April 20, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Edward D. Flint
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys at Law
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Phone Directories Company,
Inc., a Utah Corproation,
and Marc Bingham,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 930116
930016-CA
910400806

Appellee's motion to dismiss this matter is hereby
granted on the ground that the appeal is from a judgment
which is not final, and this court has no jurisdiction. Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b).
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk

EXIBITG

SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
April 22, 1993
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Edward D. Flint
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys at Law
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Phone Directories Company,
Inc., a Utah Corproation,
and Marc Bingham,
Defendants and Appellees.

No. 930116
930016-CA
910400806

THIS DAY, this case remitted to 4th Dist. Court Utah County.
Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk
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JOHN PRESTON CREER (0753)
Attorney for Plaintiffs
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 538-2300

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK,
NOTICE OF APPEAL y

Plaintiff,
vs.
PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY, INC.,
a Utah Corporation, and
MARC BINGHAM,

CIVIL NUMBER 910400806
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING

Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark, plaintiff above
named, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals on Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Order signed by the Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, on
December 8, 1992, and entered on December 9, 1992.
Dated this

(?_

day of January, 1993.

Teston Creer
ftorney for the Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF
APPEAL was mailed, postage prepaid, on the ^

day of January, 1993 to the

following:
Edward D. Flint
FLINT & CHRISTENSEN
3760 Highland Drive, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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EXIBIT I

*4Ttf^Vfr'0T COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH n j p W ^ ^ - D p ^ ^ C T
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY11
CLARK,

\P

^MICBOFIMED ^ J / J j J . /
raodiooDD JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 91040806

PHONE DIRECTORIES, I N C . ,
A UTAH CORPORATION, a n d
MARC BINGHAM,

Defendants.

The

case

of

Cecil

Eugene

"Sonny"

Clark

v.

Phone

Directories, Inc. et. al, No. 91040806, came on for trial before
the Honorable Ray H. Harding of the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah on August 27, 28 and September 22, 1992.

The plaintiff

was represented by counsel John Preston Creer and the defendant
was represented by Edward D. Flint.
After reviewing all the evidence, the Court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,. Based on these Findings
and Conclusions, the Court hereby adjudges and decrees as follows:
1.

Cecil Eugene "Sonny" Clark was an independent

contractor;
2.
plaintiff; and

A judgment of no cause of action is entered against

3.

The case is dismissed with prejudice.

Dated this

y

day of

/C&JL^

1992

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

RAY

SUBMITTED BY:

EDWARD D". FEINT
Attorney for Defendants

APPROVED AS TO FORM

N PRESTON CREER
'ttorney for Plaintiff

HARDING, JUDGE . r~ / ^

' %.
'-,\
> v.~ ^

\ -"
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISftRJiCT
Vl

IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CECIL EUGENE "SONNY"
CLARK,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OP FACT AND

vs.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

PHONE DIRECTORIES, INC.,
A UTAH CORPORATION, and
MARC BINGHAM,

Case No. 91040806

Defendants.

The

case

of

Cecil

Eugene

"Sonny"

Clark

v.

Phone

Directories, Inc. et. al. No. 91040806, came on for trial before
the Honorable Ray H. Harding of the Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah on August 27, 28 and September 22, 1992.

The plaintiff

was represented by counsel John Preston Creer and the defendant
was represented by Edward D. Flint.

The plaintiff's claim was

based on a theory of wrongful discharge.

As a threshold issue,

the parties had stipulated that if Mr. Clark could not establish
that he was an employee, he would dismiss the complaint.

Thus,

II
j| the issue tried and determined in this case was whteher Mr. Clark
; was an employee or independent contractor.
The plaintiff presented evidence through the testimony
of Sonny Clark, Linda Young, David Young and Don Reevely to
establish that Mr. Clark was an employee of Phone Directories.
The defendant presented testimony through Cindy Sorter, Vicki
Iechelbeger, lone Chilton, and Jim Latham to establish that Mr.

j; Clark was an independent contractor.

All of the witnesses, save

\\ Mr. Latham and Ms. Chilton, were sales representatives and were
jj associated with Phone Directories during the same period of time
i!

i

jj as Mr. Clark.

After considering the evidence present by the j

ij

J

j! parties over the three days of trial, reading the pre- and post- j
I trial briefs of the parties, and being fully informed of the facts j
!

i!

jj and law, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

J
Findings of Fact

1.

Plaintiff Sonny Clark worked for Phone Directories

as a sales representative from 1980 through 1991.
2.

Defendant Phone Directories, Inc. (PDC) is a Utah

and Alaska corporation with its principal place of business in
I Provo, Utah.
|

3.

PDC

sells

yellow

page

advertising

and

makes J

regional yellow page directories throughout the continental United !
i

!

States.

PDC has yellow page directories in a number of states i

I

I

j from North Carolina to Alaska.

j
|

II

|J
4.
To sell advertising in the geographic areas covered
I by the directories, Phone Directories hires sales representatives !
i

| to contact each business in the region to provide them the
! opportunity to purchase advertising in the directory.
j
5.
Based on the testimony of Mr. Clark, Vicki
! Iechelbeger, Cindy Sorter, Linda Young, David Young and Don
: Reevely, all of whom were sales representatives of PDC for varying
2

\\h)

lengths

of

time

and

in

different

locations,

Mr.

Clark's

association with PDC is typical of the relationship between PDC
J and its sales people.
11
6.

Mr. Clark's sales relationship was memorialized in

;| a written contract in which he was characterized as an independent
il contractor.

The contract provided that Mr. Clark could "handle

11

j] any other type of personal endeavors as long as [he] do[es] not
i|
l represent work for any organization of personal interests which
might be competitive to [PDC]".
7.

During the period between 1980 through 1991, Mr.

Clark worked

in the western United States —

principally in

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming.
He also conducted various other business operations including a
J heating and air conditioning service out of his home.
il also

sold

yellow

page

advertising

for

another

Mr. Clark

yellow

page

advertiser that did not compete in the same geographic area as the
I defendant. Nevertheless, the majority of plaintiff's time during
i|
It this period was spent performing contracts for PDC.
!j

|

8.

The

evidence

also

showed

that

other

sales

j representatives were allowed and frequently did maintain other
business while performing their contracts with PDC. Specifically,
Vickie lechelbeger owned, operated and managed a dump truck
service and Cindy Sorter was a representative with Mary Kay
cosmetics during the same time that each performed contracts for
PDC.
3

1

:

9,

; training.

PDC did not provide Mr. Clark with any formal

His sales methods or techniques were adapted from his

•• own experience and PDC did not impose any particular sales
|| protocol on plaintiff.
representative witnesses.
•

The same was true with the other sales
Although PDC had an annual meeting to

i

!i which plaintiff was required to attend, plaintiff was essentially
jj free to sell advertising in the manner that he determined to be
j most effective.
10.
saw fit.

Plaintiff was free to conduct his business as he

Plaintiff was not physically within PDC's direction or

control. He set his own schedule, sales appointments, managed his
n own books, arranged his own transportation, provided his own
supplies (except for uniform sales contracts) and was responsible
jj for virtually every other part of the sales function. Plaintiff
I
Ji solicited his clients in person and used his own automobile to

11
!j make such contacts. The evidence presented from all of the sales

H
Ij representative witnesses supports this finding.

I!

PDC did require

| that Mr. Clark provide weekly sales reports to enable PDC to
h
jj determine what money was owed to him so that he could be paid
!l under the contracts.
11.
Although plaintiff was entitled to receive
•

j

"tradeouts", wherein plaintiff received lodging, food, and gas in
* exchange for advertising, plaintiff was not required to do so. If
plaintiff was unable to establish a tradeout, or decided for some

4

reason not to use a tradeout, plaintiff was ultimately responsible
for his own expenses and was not entitled to reimbursement.
:j

12. Plaintiff's sales efforts were largely independent

!; of the success or continuation of PDC's business.
\\

13. Although plaintiff was ultimately responsible to

j| see that each sales area was successfully solicited, and thus the
jj job could not be assigned, plaintiff was free to hire and
supervise other people to perform the sales task.

The evidence

from the other sales representatives provided also indicates that
sales representatives routinely hired others to assist in the
solicitation of businesses in the contracted area.
14.
jj basis.
jj because

Plaintiff contracted with PDC on a "book-by-book"

Any continuing relationship between the parties existed
each

party

agreed

to

continue

with

the

business

j| relationship. Plaintiff was free to leave after the completion of
;i any book, and PDC was free not to contract with plaintiff for
jj another book.

ii
|!

15. Plaintiff was paid on a strict commission basis.

ii
j!

16. Plaintiff's profits or losses were directly related

i to the services performed, the hours worked, and the good and bad
; business decisions that were made.
17.

Plaintiff did not maintain an office, hold a

business license, maintain a business phone or advertise. Some of
the other sales representatives did, however, have offices and
business phones.
5

18.

While

the plaintiff

was performing

any

given

contract, PDC could not terminate plaintiff's rights under the
| contract unless there was a breach of the contract.
i

i

Conclusions of Law

|

'

This case involves a cause of action based on wrongful

! discharge. However, as the parties recognize, the threshold issue
to any determination of wrongful discharge is the legal conclusion
that plaintiff was an employee, rather than an

independent

contractor, and as such entitled to bring the wrongful discharge
claim. In that regard, the parties have stipulated that the first
issue for the court is a determination whether Mr. Clark was an
employee.
In support of their respective positions, both parties
| have relied on Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22.3(3) to establish the
criteria

to

be

considered

in order

to

distinguish

between

j independent contractor status and employee status. Although § 354-22.3(3)

deals

specifically

with

the

Utah

Unemployment

! Compensation Act, the Court considers this section to be a helpful
I guide in determining whether Mr. Clark was an employee or an
I independent contractor.

Therefore, the Court has considered the

facts of this case in light of each subsection of § 35-422.3(3)(a)-(t) and concludes under each section as follows:
Subsection (a):
for

location

and duration

Although PDC set broad requirements
of service, and

6

imposed

specific

reporting

;

requirements, the Court

finds

that

plaintiff

was

essentially free to set his own schedule.
Subsection (b):

Though plaintiff was required to

'i attend an annual meeting, PDC imposed minimal, if any, formal
\\ training requirements.

PDC essentially allowed Mr. Clark to use

jj his own sales methods.
jj

Subsection (c):

The court finds that plaintiff's

I services were largely independent of the success or continuation
of defendant's business.
I

Subsection (d) and (e): Although plaintiff's services
could not be assigned, plaintiff enjoyed the right to hire and
supervise others to perform the contract.
Subsection (f):

Plaintiff

had

a

continuing

relationship with PDC, but did so only by continuing to accept new
"books" as PDC offered them to him. Plaintiff essentially worked
! i

jj on a book-by-book basis.

|l
I

Subsection (g):

See

Court's

consideration

of

!

!l subsection (a) .
I

Subsection (h):

The Court finds that plaintiff was

! free to devote time to other business endeavors and did so.
Subsection (i):

Plaintiff was not physically within

• defendant's direction and supervision.

To the extent that

i plaintiff's compliance with the contract required that he contact
each business in the area, plaintiff supplied his own car to make
those contacts.
7

Subsection (j):

Plaintiff

enjoyed

substantial

flexibility in setting and working at his own pace.
Subsection (k):

Plaintiff was required to submit

; regular reports to enable PDC to determine what money was owed
!

i

i him.

'I

Subsection (1):

Plaintiff was paid on a straight

Ii commission basis.
jj

Subsection (m) :

Although plaintiff could cover some

j j of his expenses through "trades," he was ultimately responsible
I for his expenses and was not entitled to reimbursement.
i

Subsection (n):

Defendants supplied some forms for

h plaintiff's use in his sales. However, plaintiff was responsible
l! for any other materials to the extent that they were necessary.

ii

.

.

.

.

i
Subsection (o):
This
subsection
is
largely
ij
J | inapplicable to this case because the nature of the business at
.j
jj issue does not require a "real, essential, and adequate
!|

ij investment" (other than perhaps an automobile).

At any rate, it

ij is clear that plaintiff did not depend on defendants for "such
II facilities."
:|
i i

1

Subsection (p):
Plaintiff's profits and losses were
directly related to the services he performed and the good or poor

!

decisions that he made.

I!

Subsection (q) :

Although plaintiff devoted some time

to his heating and air conditioning business, plaintiff spent the
majority of his time fulfilling contracts for PDC.
8

Subsection (r) :

Plaintiff

did

not have his own

office, hold a business license, maintain a business telephone, or
advertise.
Subsection (s):

PDC

could

not

have

terminated

plaintiff during the performance of any given contract, unless
plaintiff breached the contract.
Subsection (t):

Plaintiff

probably

could

have

terminated his relationship with PDC at any time.
Although, individually, a few of the factors considered
above weigh in the favor of a finding that Mr. Clark was an
employee, on balance the evidence preponderates in favor of a
finding that plaintiff was an independent contractor. Therefore,
the Court concludes that bases on the law and the facts that PDC
could terminate its relationship with plaintiff, with or without
cause, after completion of the last "book" assigned to plaintiff.
Judgment is ordered in favor of defendant.
Dated this

tf

day of (y^Z^L^
BY THE COURT

SUBMITTED BY:

WAREMD. FLINT
Attorney for Defendants

9

, 1992.

APPROVED AS TQ^FORM

CREER
:orney for Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

[)&~

UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CECIL EUGENE "SONNY" CLARK,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 910400806
vs.

PHONE DIRECTORIES COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation, and MARC
BINGHAM,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendants.

Having received memoranda and having considered all the evidence presented at the
trial of this case, the Court finds that plaintiff performed services for defendants as an
independent contractor, and not as an employee. Accordingly, plaintiffs action for wrongful
discharge must fail.
In their trial briefs, plaintiff and defendants rely on § 35-4-22.3(3) Utah Code Ann. to
establish the criteria to be considered in order to distinguish between independent contractor
status and employment status. Although the factors enumerated in § 35-4-22.3(3) are
contained in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Act and are to be considered for the
purpose of determining eligibility under the act, the Court finds that these factors provide
helpful guidance in this case. Therefore, the Court has considered the facts of the instant
case in light of each subsection of § 35-4-22.3(3).

Subsection (a): Although defendants set broad requirements for location and duration
of service, and imposed specific reporting requirements, the Court finds that plaintiff was
essentially free to set his own schedule.
Subsection (b): Though plaintiff was required to attend an annual meeting,
Defendants imposed minimal, if any, formal training requirements. They essentially allowed
him to use his own methods.
Subsection (c): The Court finds that plaintiffs services were largely independent of
the success or continuation of defendants' business.
Subsections (d) and (e): The Court concedes that plaintiffs services probably could
not have been assigned. However, plaintiff enjoyed the right to hire and supervise others to
perform his services.
Subsection (f): Plaintiff enjoyed a continuing relationship with defendants, but did so
only by continuing to accept new "books" as defendants offered them to him. Plaintiff
essentially worked on a job-by-job basis.
Subsection (g): See Courts consideration of subsection (a).
Subsection (h): The Court finds that plaintiff was free to devote time to other
endeavors and did so.
Subsection (i): Plaintiff was not physically within defendants' direction and
supervision, and he used his own car to make his contacts.
Subsection (j): Plaintiff enjoyed substantial flexibility in setting and working at his
own pace.
Subsection (k): Plaintiff was required to submit regular reports.
Subsection (1): Plaintiff was paid on a straight commission basis.

Subsection (m): Although plaintiff could cover some of his expenses through
"trades," he was ultimately responsible for his expenses and was not entitled to
reimbursement.
Subsection (n): Defendants supplied some forms for plaintiffs use in his sales.
However, plaintiff was responsible for any other materials to the extent that they were
necessary.
Subsection (o): The Court finds that subsection (o) is largely inapplicable to the
instant case because the nature of the business at issue does not require a "real, essential, and
adequate investment" (other than an automobile perhaps). At any rate, it is clear that
plaintiff did not depend on defendants for "such facilities."
Subsection (p): Plaintiffs profits or losses were directly related to the services he
performed and the good or poor decisions he made.
Subsection (q): Although plaintiff devoted some time to his heating and air
conditioning business, the Court concedes that he primarily worked for the defendants.
Subsection (r): The Court acknowledges that plaintiff did not have his own office,
hold a business license, maintain a business telephone, advertise, etc.
Subsection (s): Defendants could not have terminated plaintiff on any particular job,
unless plaintiff breached his contract.
Subsection (t): Plaintiff probably could have terminated his relationship with
defendants at any time.
Although a few or the factors considered above weigh in favor of a finding of
employment, on balance the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding that plaintiff was an
independent contractor. Therefore the Court concludes that defendants were entitled to

terminate their relationship with plaintiff, with or without cause, after completion of the last
"book" assigned to plaintiff. Judgement is ordered in favor of defendants.
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no
effect until such order is signed by the Court.

Dated this 10th day of November, 1992.

BY THE COURT:

cc:

John Preston Creer, Esq.
Edward D. Flint, Esq.
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